A NONPARAMETRIC TEST OF ADVERTISING'S EFFECTIVENESS by Chalfant, James A. & Eshel, Dafna M. Disegni
A Nonparametric Test of Advertising's Eectiveness
James A. Chalfant
Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics
University of California, Davis
Dafna M. DiSegni Eshel
Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics
University of California, Davis
May 15, 2001
Abstract
Nonparametric demand analysis uses axioms of revealed preference to test a data
set for compatibility with the hypothesis of stable preferences. Previous applications
have tested for the presence of structural change using this approach. This paper shows
how to include demand shifters such as advertising in the analysis. It is shown that
the implied results for changes in tastes depend on restrictions on advertising's eects.
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ectiveness
Evaluating the returns to generic promotion of agricultural products has interested agricul-
tural economists for some time. Such promotion is controversial, as evidenced by several
recent legal challenges, including the Wileman case decided by the U.S. Supreme Court in
1996 and, more recently, the United Foods case, heard by the Court in April. The manda-
tory nature of check-o schemes to fund generic advertising is its most contentious aspect,
but there is also disagreement about the eects of the advertising itself. Crespi and Sex-
ton provide an up-to-date assessment of the legal setting for marketing orders and generic
promotion. As they suggest, generic promotion seems likely to remain controversial.
Measurement of the eects of promotion is also somewhat controversial. Piggott et al.
likened the problem to the more general problem of measuring structural change in demand.
In both cases, tests of hypotheses of interest|no structural change or no demand shifts
due to promotion|are conditional on maintained hypotheses concerning functional form,
assumptions about the simultaneity of prices and expenditure, separability, aggregation,
etc. In particular, a lot of attention has been paid to the sensitivity of results to decisions
concerning the functional form of demand equations and those concerning how the variables
meant to capture the demand shift are included in the model.
These problems are not all unique to demand analysis, although an impression that at
least some demand analysts pay more attention to these problems than is common in other
elds of research is probably not incorrect. A solution to the problems of functional form and
uncertainty about simultaneity is provided by nonparametric demand analysis using revealed
1preference. Because the method does not involve regression, such assumptions are not part
of the analysis. Varian (1982) marked a renewal of interest in the approach, which dates back
to Samuelson, Houthakker, and Afriat. Studies applying the method to consumption data
include Landsburg; Chalfant and Alston; Burton; Sakong and Hayes; Cortez and Senauer;
and Chalfant and Zhang. For examples using production data, see Varian (1984), Chavas
and Cox (1988, 1994), Cox and Chavas, and others.
To date, no one has modeled the eects of promotion on demand using a nonparamet-
ric approach. A pessimistic version of the preceding statement is that every result in the
literature concerning the eects of promotion has been conditional on an ad hoc assumption
concerning functional form. Moreover, the typical study uses only one functional form, so
there is little formal evidence concerning how seriously one should take the problem of the
functional form as maintained hypothesis. Simulations pertaining to the more general area
of structural change in Alston and Chalfant (1991) are not encouraging regarding the likely
fragility of the measured eects of promotion.
The nonparametric approach is not a panacea, a point made most recently by Chal-
fant and Zhang. It should probably be viewed as a supplement to more familiar parametric
methods. For instance, its power is unknown, it does not lend itself naturally to a statisti-
cal interpretation, with such familiar summary measures as condence intervals for eects
of interest, and, like the parametric approach, it is conditional on the data-related mod-
eling assumptions concerning separability and aggregation. If nothing else, however, the
nonparametric approach serves to indicate whether the eect being measured is a strong
2characteristic of the data, or whether it will be necessary to make assumptions concerning
functional form and perhaps elasticities in order to measure the eect of interest.
The above points will be elaborated as the paper progresses. The following section
serves as a brief review of some particular methods in the nonparametric area, beginning
with the simplest: are the data consistent with revealed preference axioms? Additional
constraints will then be placed on the data to measure demand responses to promotion. The
paper then turns to an analysis involving promotion.
Testing for Stable Preferences
Testing a data set for structural change is simple. Suppose there are T observations on
price and (per capita) quantity vectors for the n goods of interest. The n goods must either
exhaust the budget or represent a group for which weak separability is assumed. The data
could have been generated by a well-behaved, stable utility function, provided that the data
set contains no violations of Houthakker's Strong Axiom of Revealed Preference (SARP).
This is easily checked.
Let the matrix C = ffCijgg i;j = 1;:::;T, where Cij = pi  qj. Cij thus represents
the cost of the time j quantity vector at time i prices. A violation of the Weak Axiom of
Revealed Preference (WARP) then has occurred if both Cii > Cij and Cjj > Cji. A violation
of WARP implies either irrational behavior or a preference reversal. Finding no violations of
WARP can be interpreted as a nding of stable preferences. Since WARP does not rule out
violations of transitivity, consistency with the Strong Axiom of Revealed Preference (SARP)
or the Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preference (GARP) in Varian (1982) is the more
3complete test of whether observed data are consistent with the maximization of a stable,
well-behaved utility function.
A violation of SARP is of the form Cii > Cij, Cjj > Cjk, and Ckk > Cki. The rst
inequality implies qiRqj, the second qjRqk, and the third qkRqi. Any number of observa-
tions can comprise the SARP violation: for instance, Cii > Cij, Cjj > Cjk, and Ckk > Ckl,
and Cll > Cli are jointly inconsistent with well-behaved preferences. If no such violations
of transitivity are found, then the data can be rationalized, as Varian (1982) termed consis-
tency with revealed preference. This means that there is some utility function that, when
maximized subject to the budget constraints implied by the observed prices and expenditure,
would have yielded the observed consumption bundles each period.
Since Landsburg, there has been concern over the power of such a test. Will data sets
that are not consistent with stable preferences still appear consistent, because the test is not
powerful? Perhaps data that were generated from one set of changing preferences will appear
to be consistent with a dierent, stable set of preferences. Varian (1982) noted that, in the
typical case of expenditures growing over time, each year's bundle will be revealed preferred
to all previously observed bundles, and preference changes are unlikely to be detected, due
to the fact that they are confounded with the observed eects of expenditure growth.
Chalfant and Alston suggested a procedure by which observed quantities could be ad-
justed for expenditure growth, yielding a set of adjusted quantities that could then be tested
for stability. They noted that this procedure would increase the power of the test, to the ex-
tent that the information imposed on expenditure elasticities was correct. Sakong and Hayes
4advanced this approach considerably, by recasting WARP as a comparison of compensated
demands. Their procedure permits ranges of expenditure elasticities to be incorporated,
unlike the single-point approach of Chalfant and Alston, and places the compensation in the
context of the underlying substitution and income eects from consumer theory. The next
section of the paper elaborates.
Incorporating Information Concerning Elasticities
We begin with equation (1) from Sakong and Hayes (p. 271), modied to include a vector of
r advertising variables, A. The demand for good i (i = 1;2;:::;n) is
xi = fi(p;y;A;ct)




















The meaning of the above equation is that the observed changes in xi consumption should be
explainable by price changes, changes in expenditures on the group of goods, and the eects
of advertising of good i or related goods; any residual change is attributed to the eects of
a change in the taste variable.



































































































i;y is the income elasticity of demand for good i, and i;Ak is the elasticity of demand for
good i with respect to advertising variable Ak.
Now add a time subscript:

















































As in Sakong and Hayes, the left-hand side is the sum of the previous quantity demanded
and the substitution eect of price changes from t   1 to t, and is by denition the time t
compensated demand x
t. The right-hand side is the time t quantity demanded, minus the
changes in that quantity that can be attributed to changes in expenditure and to changes in
advertising.
In the simplest version of nonparametric demand analysis, revealed preference axioms
are checked with observed quantities. Those quantities change from observation to obser-
6vation as all exogenous variables change; nothing is held constant. An observed change in
consumption patterns may be equally consistent with some taste change, on the one hand,
or with stable preferences and a particular collection of expenditure elasticities and income
eects, on the other. Chalfant and Alston noted that the stable preferences that rationalize a
particular data set may also imply expenditure elasticities that are implausible. There is no
way to tell if that is the case with the standard WARP or SARP conditions, but by working
with the compensated demands derived above, it is possible to nd the set of expenditure
elasticities and taste changes needed to rationalize the data. When the data can be rational-
ized with no taste changes and plausible expenditure elasticities, it would not be possible to
reject the stable preferences hypothesis. Alternatively, if constraints on the allowable set of
expenditure elasticities|ruling out inferior goods, for instance|require taste changes, then
a test of stability that incorporates prior information about expenditure elasticities has been
achieved. In this manner, the Sakong and Hayes method permits testing for stable prefer-
ences, or estimating taste changes, while imposing whatever prior information is desired by
the researcher.
All that is necessary is to construct a series of compensated demands, and then to
check what Sakong and Hayes (p. 272) termed the convexity conditions. Their method can
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iy  0 8 i;t:
The vector b consists of constant weights and CTC is the vector of taste changes, across all
goods and observations. The choice variables are the elasticities and the taste changes. This
problem replaces the standard test for compatibility with revealed preference, as in Varian
or Chalfant and Alston, with a test for whether the data are consistent simultaneously with
stable preferences and expenditure elasticities that are all positive, thereby ruling out inferior
goods, and that satisfy Engel aggregation. If CTC = 0 can be achieved, then the data can be
rationalized, subject to the constraints imposed, by picking the right elasticities. Otherwise,
the program nds the smallest set of taste changes that will make the data set consistent
with stable preferences.
Our modication of their method introduces advertising; we simply add the term for
advertising eects to the formula for the compensated demand, and then impose whatever
constraints on the signs and magnitudes of advertising elasticities as may seem appropri-
ate. To the extent that quantities consumed shift from advertising, not expenditures, that
shift can thus also be accounted for, instead of attributing the apparent demand shift to a
taste change of unknown origin. Any remaining variation in quantities, not explained by
expenditures and advertising, then is attributed to the eects of taste changes.
8Comparison to Regression
The discussion above could have been applied to a regression model. By including variables
thought to help explain the dependent variable, one hopes to attribute less and less remaining
unexplained variation to error. The taste changes that are produced by the nonparametric
method can be thought of as being analogous to the errors from a regression model|they
each are departures from the demand model fully explaining quantities|but there is an
important dierence. Adding advertising, for instance, to the typical demand equation to be
estimated using parametric regression techniques, we would likely treat its coecient as a
constant. While there is no particular reason to believe that the eects of an incremental unit
of advertising eort or expenditure has the same eect on demand for every observation, the
constant parameters assumption is inherent in most parametric methods. Certainly, a Chow
test for structural change is one way to accommodate this, but most demand applications do
not relax the constant parameters assumption beyond some specic break point, or maybe
do so only by interacting variables such as advertising with a trend or some other measure of
parameter shift. In the limit, treating the parameters of the model as random, and shifting
at every data point, a perfect explanation of the data can always be achieved. This is
analogous to adding a dummy variable for one specic observation|as is well known, that
dummy variable's coecient is the residual for that observation when the intercept is held
constant. An observation-specic dummy is equivalent to allowing the intercept to shift for
that one observation, and a perfect prediction is guaranteed.
Naturally, some compromise must be reached, somewhere between the choice of making
9a few parameters constant for all observations, in which case, structural change seems very
likely with most time-series data, or letting the parameters change so often that any series
of data can be explained away by parameter shifts. Certainly, without multiple observations
in the same time period, there is a fundamental lack of identication between taste change
and one-time parameter shifts.
Our nonparametric method has the same problem. Suppose that, without advertising,
there appeared to be a taste change needed to reconcile one observation with the stable
preferences hypothesis, as captured by the conditions comprising SARP. With advertising,
we can simply solve for the advertising elasticity needed to equate what appeared to be a
taste change with the eect of advertising. At another inconsistent observation, that same
advertising elasticity would likely need to take on a dierent value to reconcile the second
data point. In a model where advertising elasticities must be constant, such a reconciliation
is not possible. In a nonparametric model that simply nds particular values to solve for
the zero taste-change condition, it is easy to achieve. Thus, in the empirical work below,
we illustrate how the implied taste changes vary from zero to something closer to what a
parametric model might nd, by limiting the ranges over which particular elasticities are
allowed to vary.
Before turning to the application, one more note of interpretation might be useful.
In all parametric demand models but the double-log, elasticities are not constant across
observations. For instance, in the Almost Ideal demand system, the formulas for price
and income elasticities show that the magnitudes of elasticities depend on budget shares.
10Whether predicted or actual shares are used to evaluate elasticity formulas, anything that
changes shares|prices or income, certainly|will change elasticities. It is the underlying
coecients, such as the coecient on real income in the share equation, that are constant.
Elasticities thus change in a pre-determined way, according to the formulas. This point
is made in a very compelling demonstration, in another context, by Despotakis. Thus,
nonparametric demand analysis, which at rst seems very ad hoc and overly 
exible, since
elasticities change at every data point, is not that much dierent than parametric models in
that property. The elasticities from parametric models change at every data point in ways
that are not usually given much thought, but the nonparametric approach facilitates adding
some structure, if desired, to the pattern of implied elasticities.
In the discussion that follows, we show the eects of constraining rst expenditure
elasticities, following Sakong and Hayes, and then also advertising elasticities. From the
above discussion, it is clear that we will nd a relationship between the role of advertising
in shifting tastes, and estimated taste changes. The particular magnitudes of elasticities
and taste changes, across various sets of assumptions, cannot be understood without the
empirical framework.
Data Description
The empirical illustration uses data from Piggott et al. for Australian meat demand. The
data are quarterly (1970:II to 1988:IV), consisting of the prices and per capita quantities of
beef, lamb, pork, and chicken. Two variables representing advertising eort are available:
expenditures on advertising by the Australian Pork Corporation (APC), on behalf of pork
11producers, and expenditures on advertising by the Australian Meat and Livestock Corpo-
ration (AMLC), for beef and lamb. These advertising expenditure data are from Ball and
Dewbre. They were computed as the sum of real advertising expenditures in each of three
media (television, radio, and print), calculated as nominal advertising expenditure de
ated
by a price index for each medium, and are expressed in thousands of dollars.
The data show a shift away from beef consumption beginning in the late 1970s, and a
steady increase in chicken consumption over time. Consumption of lamb and pork was rela-
tively stable over the same period. Figures 1a and 1b show the trends in meat consumption
and prices, respectively, over the sample period. Figure 1c shows the advertising activity by
AMLC and APC, which began in 1977 and increased substantially over the sample period.
It is not surprising that it is hard to separate the eects of prices, advertising, and
taste change. Advertising activity began during a period of rising prices of beef, lamb, and
pork. In spite of the perceived instability, Piggott et al. (p. 269) found that these data were
consistent with GARP, implying that a stable, well-behaved utility function can rationalize
the data. This means that there is some set of per capita demand relationships that generate
the observed quantities as functions of prices and expenditures alone. There is no need
to include a trend variable, quarterly dummies to capture seasonality, or advertising. As
noted by Piggott et al. and discussed above, such a nding does not mean that a particular
functional form will appear to be stable, or that the implied elasticities are at all plausible.
It also does not mean that, when a parametric model is tried or restrictions on elasticities
are imposed, there will not be evidence of some structural change, including some eects of
12advertising. It means only that nding signicant structural change or advertising eects
depends crucially on the other restrictions imposed on the model. Since we often do have
prior beliefs about likely ranges of elasticities, imposing that information may well be a
preferred approach, relative to the ad hoc adoption of a particular functional form (Chalfant
and Alston). We turn now to exploring the eects of such restrictions on elasticities.
Empirical Results
We began by estimating taste changes using the Sakong and Hayes problem described above.
Advertising was not included, and expenditure elasticities were required only to be non-
negative, and to satisfy adding-up. The estimated expenditure elasticities turned out to
be fairly large for some observations. Expenditure elasticities for pork ranged between 0
and 6.314, for lamb between 0 and 7.21, and for chicken between 0 and 9.061. Expenditure
elasticities for beef were more reasonable (between 0 and 2.25), although still high relative to
previous estimates and common sense. This suggests that we were understating the degree
of taste change, and imposing unduly mild restrictions on expenditure elasticities.
The next program we ran incorporated restrictions on the allowable ranges for es-
timated expenditure elasticities. We restricted the expenditure elasticity for beef to be
between 1.042 and 1.369, the expenditure elasticity for pork to be between 0.462 and 1.374,
and the expenditure elasticities for lamb and chicken to be between 0.392 and 1.374. These
are more plausible ranges, taken from published estimates for other data sets.
The eects of the further restrictions can be seen by comparing Figures 2 and 3. Figure
2 shows our estimated per capita taste changes, in kilograms, relative to the rst data point,
13the second quarter of 1970. Our program nds the amounts to add to observed quantities
to reconcile them with stable preferences. Thus, a negative taste change means that the
observed quantity was too large; we had to add a negative number to reconcile the data.
There are few instances where a taste change of either sign was needed. Certainly, the
results do not detect a continuous trend away from beef during the 1970s and 1980s, as was
suggested by some previous studies, but a small shift toward beef during the early 1970s,
and then very small shifts both to and from beef during the 1980s. The results for other
meats are comparable.
Figure 3 shows the new series of estimated taste changes after restricting expenditure
elasticities. The magnitudes are considerably larger, and suggest a shift away from beef in
the mid-1970s, and again at a few data points in the 1980s. These results reinforce the
argument made by Sakong and Hayes; restrictions on expenditure elasticities lead to larger
taste changes. As long as the restrictions we have imposed are plausible, Figure 3 represents
a more plausible story than does Figure 2.
We added advertising eects to the model in Figure 4. The only restriction that
advertising elasticities must satisfy for Figure 4 is adding-up. We kept the same restrictions
on expenditure elasticities as were incorporated in Figure 3. As predicted, without restricting
the advertising elasticities, the implied taste changes are zero, as soon as there were positive
amounts of advertising observed in the data. As we discussed above, this is because the
advertising elasticities can be adjusted arbitrarily to produce exactly the shift in quanitities
previously attributed to taste changes. As was the case with the expenditure elasticities in
14Figure 2, the estimated advertising elasticities themselves are naturally fairly unstable and
not necessarily plausible.
Advertising elasticities for APC ranged between -0.74 and 0.828 for beef, -2.875 and
1.097 for pork, -0.911 and 1.489 for lamb, and between -1.9 and 3.353 for chicken. Clearly,
these are not plausible ranges; not even the signs remain stable throughout the sample
period. Similarly, elasticities for AMLC ranged between -0.158 and 1.22 for beef, -2.7 and
19.57 for pork, -12.32 and 1.152 for lamb, and between -14.93 and 2.99 for chicken.1
We conclude with Figure 5, which restricts the advertising elasticities. We chose a fairly
simple restriction: the elasticities with respect to APC advertising must all be between 0
and 0.01. As can be seen in Figure 5, it is no longer possible for the program to explain away
all of the taste changes using the advertising shifters. Although the estimated taste changes
are small, there now are some non-zero values after advertising began. Eleven instances of
taste changes are found; there are seven observations for which the beef quantity must be
adjusted and four observations for which pork must be adjusted.
Conclusion
This paper introduced a method for incorporating advertising or other demand shifters into
nonparametric demand analysis. The method extends previous work by Sakong and Hayes
that permitted imposing prior beliefs about elasticities by making it possible to introduce
similar prior beliefs about advertising elasticities. Indeed, this paper demonstrated that,
without such prior beliefs, there will never be an estimated taste change when any demand
1Similar results were found when we replaced the contemporaneous advertising variable with the current
value plus four lags.
15shifter, such as advertising, can be used to explain away the apparent taste changes.
More work is clearly needed to determine plausible restrictions on advertising elastici-
ties. While prior beliefs about advertising eects come from parametric studies, it is essential
to place restrictions on elasticities in the nonparametric approach.
A further area of improvement for data sets such as this one is in modeling seasonality.
We did not attempt to correct for seasonal variation in quantities consumed, although using
quarterly data leaves us with more variation to be explained than in the typical time-series
application with annual data. It may be that incorporating corrections for seasonality, if
it is signicant in a particular data set, will lead to more precise estimates of the eects of
advertising and taste changes.
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19Figure 2: Estimated Taste Changes, No Advertising Variables Included

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































20Figure 3: Estimated Taste Changes, No Advertising, Restricted Expenditure Elasticities
 
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































21Figure 4: Estimated Taste Changes with Unrestricted Advertising Eects
 
 



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































22Figure 5: Estimated Taste Changes with Restricted Advertising Eects
 

































































































































































































































































C. Taste Change in lamb
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